Smart Grid Monitoring System(SGMS) is an important means to protect the security of smart grid. The high volumes of alerts generated by SGMS often confuse managers. Automatically handling alerts and extracting attack events is a critical issue for smart grid. Most of the existing security event analysis methods are designed for Internet, which will not be directly applicable to the power grid for high reliability and low attack tolerance requirements. In this paper, a multi-step attack detection model based on alerts of SGMS is proposed. In this model, an alert graph is constructed by IP correlation, and then transformed into candidate attack chains after being aggregated. Consequently, the candidate preliminary attack chains are pruned and denoised by negative causal correlation and non-cascading events. Finally, attack chains and visual attack graphs are formed. Our proposal model needs a little of priori knowledge while automatically extracting multi-step attack events and demonstrating the trajectories among IPs. The experimental results show the model performs well on China Grid data and DARPA 2000 data set.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whis the construction of smart grid and the wide application of big data, cloud computing and Internet of Things technologies, the power grid is facing the vulnerabilities and risks of the Internet [1] - [3] , which brings challenges to the original security protection system of power. To approach this challenge, security protection and management systems, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems(IDS), vertical encryption authentication systems and anti-virus systems, have been studied and applied in power grids [4] - [7] . These systems generate a large number of independent alerts, and the real threat information can easily be flooded with a large number of useless alerts [8] . Therefore, how to handle the alerts and detect major security incidents more accurately has become a major problem in smart grid [9] , [10] .
With the development of security protection technology, multi-step attacks have become the main form of attack [11] , [12] . Multi-step attack detection technology, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ana Lucila Sandoval Orozco.
which is oriented to large-scale network environment, plays an important role in network security monitoring system. It acquires, understands, displays the security factors and future trends in network situation.
In the Smart Grid control center, once an attack occurs, unpredictable serious consequences for the entire grid infrastructure may happen. On December 23, 2015, the Ukrainian power sector was attacked by malicious codes. More than half of the area and part of the Ivano-Frankovsk area were cut off for several hours. Therefore, high reliability attack detection and quick location of attack paths strategies are required for such production environments.
For the smart grid alert logs with the above characteristics, the existing analysis methods face some challenges. Common methods of alert log analysis include similaritybased correlation analysis [13] - [15] , attack sequence-based approach [16] , [17] , and attack sample-based machine learning [8] , [18] - [20] .
The similarity-based correlation analysis mainly uses the similar characteristics of same kinds of alerts. However, since the logs of the SGMS have been aggregated, the similarity VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ is weakend and the method produce little effect in smart grid alert logs. Fig.1 shows some segments of a class of alerts obtained by similarity-based correlation analysis in reference [15] . These alerts do not belong to the same attack. In addition, aggregation methods cannot describe the attack paths. It just bring the alerts of the same event together. Attack sequence-based approach associates alert by matching attack rules [21] . It is difficult to cover all attacks [14] . In addition, the SGMS has different and more strict attack detection strategies, which generates different alerts from the internet, like illegal protocol detection and usb insertion detection. It is hard to draw lessons from mature experience.
Attack sample-based machine learning first needs to acquire alert logs or network traffic which are labeled with attack types for learning [22] . Labeling work requires directly obtaining attack logs by constructing virtual scene of simulating attacks or manual verification of attacks. However, because the alert logs in SGMS are already aggregated [4] , and manual verification has large workload and difficult to implement in smart grid, the alert logs cannot be simulated.
Contributions: To solve the above problems, this paper proposes a multi-step attack detection model based on the alerts of Smart Grid Monitoring System with only a small amount of expert knowledge. The contributions of this paper are as followings: 1) We extract attack chains according to IP hops, as well as propose a child node aggregation method based on smart grid network alert graph. The attack chains are sequences of suspicious behavior. Because the attack chains are extracted according to IP hops, they also retain the host information of the attack chains. The child node aggregation is carried out before the formation of attack chains, which effectively reduces the redundancy by aggregating child nodes in the alert graph that belong to the same attack. 2) A negative causal correlation method is proposed to eliminate the non-causal alerts. The alerts of SGMS have a variety of granularity and types, and it is difficult to formulate attack rules. However, the method we propose can prune attack chains while minimizing the dependence on expert knowledge. 3) An attack chains denoise method based on noncascading event is proposed. This method can reduce the redundancy of attack chains by removing the events that are obviously not caused by previous ones.
II. MULTI-STEP ATTACK DETECTION MODEL FRAMEWORK
At first, there are two basic definitions that need to be explained.
Definition 1 (Multi-Step Attack):
A well-predefined intrusion process with more than one attack action is called a multi-step attack. The intrusion should include a clear purpose of attack. [23] . The intrusion process includes 1) default credential discovering through a brute-force attack, 2) shell gaining and forwarding various device characteristics to the report server, 3) new prospective target victims checking, 4) infection command sending to the loader, 5) downloading and executing the corresponding binary version of the malware, 6) instructing all bot instances to commence an attack against a target server. The purpose of the intruder is using bot instances launching a DDoS attack to the target server. In order to achieve this purpose, the intruder has to prepare well and implement multiple actions.
Definition 2 (Single-Step Attack): Each attack action in multi-step attack is called a single-step attack. A single-step attack may correspond to one alert or multiple duplicated alerts.
A variety of security devices are deployed in the SGMS. The control center aggregates the original alerts into alert log [4] . As shown in Fig. 3 , the inputs are the original alerts of the SGMS. After pre-processing, they are formed structureing, noiseless and analyzable alerts. Then they are sent to the preliminary attack chain building module for aggregating and traversing. After that, preliminary attack chains are formed. Then they will be pruned and denoised by the Postprocessing module. Finally, interconnected attack chains are drawn into individual subgraphs.
A. PRE-PROCEEING
The pre-processing module first reconstructs the original alerts, and then performs de-duplication processing to obtain the alert logs. The reconstructed alert contains necessary fields for alert log analysis, which represented as a 10-tuple Alert(Starttime, Fintime, Content, Type, SrcIP, DstIP, SrcPort, DstPort, Times, Level). In a reconstructed alert, Starttime represents the start time of the alert event. Fintime represents the finish time of the alert event. Content represents the alert content. Type represents the alert type. SrcIP represents the source address. DstIP represents the destination address. SrcPort represents the source port. DstPort represents the destination port. Times represents the number of alert repetitions. Level represents the alert level.
After reconstruction, the alert logs need to be de-duplicated. A complete attack process involves at least one attack step. For a single-step attack in multi-step attacks, the security device may report multiple redundancy alerts. But not all same alerts belong to the same attack.The deduplication of the alert logs based on the retention of time information can not only reduce the number of alerts, but also retaining the most source data information. The deduplication rule is: if the type, IP and port of an alert are the same as any of the previous two, the latter alert will be removed. The previous alert's Finishtime will be updated to the removed one, and Times will be accumulated.
B. ATTACK CHAINS BUILDING (PROCESSING)
In the attack chain building module, alert graph is structured by the alert logs. Then the redundant information is removed by aggregation. Finally, the attack chains are obtained after the depth-first traversal. The detailed process is in Section III.
C. POST-PROCESSING
The post-processing module removes the unreasonable attack chains. The negative causal association module prunes the attack chains by negative causal rules, and the non-cascading event noise reduction module denoises the attack chains through the continuity of events. The detailed process is in section IV and section V.
D. ATTACK GRAPH BUILDING
The attack graph building module presents the association between attack chains intuitively. The process is mainly divided into two steps: structureing the attack chains into a directed graph; dividing interconnected parts into independent subgraphs.
III. INITIAL CONSTRUCTION OF IP-BASED ATTACK CHAINS
The construction of the attack chains based on IP is divided into three steps: structureing node information, child node aggregation, and alert graph depth-first traversal.
A. STRUCTUREING NODE INFORMATION
The alert log can be regarded as a network which is connected by source and destination IPs. Nodes of the network are host IPs. Node information structureing process can construct such a network into a graph diagram struct.
The structured multi-step attack is an attack chain. The single-step attacks in an attack chain meet three conditions:
• IP Relevance: The destination IP of a single-step attack is the source IP of the next one.
• Causal Relevance: A single-step attack has a causal relationship with the previous one logically.
• Temporality: The Starttime of a single-step attack is later than that of the previous one. We indicate IP as the IP address of the single-step attack in the attack chain and Alert as the alert information (including Content, Starttime, Finishtime, etc.). The attack chain can be represented as C 1 = [(IP 1 , IP 2 , Alert 1 ), (IP 2 , IP 3 , Alert 2 ), VOLUME 8, 2020 (IP 3 , IP 4 , Alert 3 )]. Fig. 4 shows an example of attack chain, Table 1 lists the corresponding alert log. In the entire network, IP-based alerts in alert log can be represented as a graph diagram. Table 2 shows an example of alert logs. Fig. 5 shows the alert graph corresponding to Table 2 . The graph nodes represent IPs and directed edges represent the alerts from source IPs to destination IPs. The graph diagram of the alerts in the network can facilitate the following child node aggregation and attack chain extraction process.
Each IP node is modeled to a TNode class: TNode = {SelfIP, ParentsIP, ChildrenInfo}. SelfIP is the node's own IP, ParentsIP is its parents' IP set, and ChildrenInfo is its children with their corresponding alert information. Alert graphs are constructed while nodes modeling. Now each IP is represented by a unique node.
B. CHILD NODE AGGREGATION
After structing alert logs, preliminary attack chains can be obtained by depth-first traversal with root nodes.
However, there is still a lot of redundancy in alert logs. In order to further aggregate these alerts while retaining the alert information as much as possible, we proposed the Child Node Aggregation Algorithm as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Child Node Aggregation Algorithm
Require: N: All TNode in alert logs; t: Aggregation interval 1: function CHILD NODE AGGREGATION(N , t) //First time aggregation 8: for child ∈ Children[2 . . . k] do 9: if lastChild == child then 10: lastChild.Finishtime ← child.Finishtime 11: delete child 12: else 13: lastChild ← child 14: end if 15: end for 16: 17: //Second time aggregation 18: Let i = 0 19: for child ∈ Children[2 . . . k] do 20: i ← i + 1 21: for lastChild ∈ Children[1 . . . i] do 22: if child == lastChild and (child.end − lastChild .start < t) then 23: lastChild.Finishtime ← child.Finishtime 24: delete child 25: break for 26: end if 27: end for 28: end for 29: end for 30: 
end function
The algorithm traverses the set N , and aggregates the child nodes. This algorithm contains twice aggregations: In the first aggregation, if same events from host A to B have been continuously happening, and no other events triggered by A occured during this period, then the continues events are considered to be the same attack. The algorithm first traverses each node's child node set. Once the alert type, source IP, and destination IP of one child node and the previous child node are the same, update the Finishtime of the previous one to the latter one and accumulate the Times. Then delete the latter event.
The second aggregation is based on a premise that the same events that occur in a small time window belong to the same attack. The algorithm first traverses each node's child nodes set. Once the alert type, source IP, and destination IP of the two child nodes are the same, while the time range between the two alerts is not bigger than the setting time window, update the Finishtime of the previous event to the latter one and accumulate the Times. Then delete the latter event.
C. GETTING THE ATTACK CHAIN
After the node modeling and the child node aggregation, we propose the Get Chains Algorithm as algorithm 2. This algorithm is for deeply traversing the alert graphs and obtain attack chains. The head nodes of the chains include two cases.
Algorithm 2 Get Chains Algorithm
Require: N: All TNode in alert logs Ensure: C: A set of chains 1: function GET CHAINS(N ) 2: for each node ∈ N do 3: if node has no parent then 4: C ← DFS(node) 5 :
for each node ∈ N do 10: C ← DFS(node) 11 :
end for 13: return C 14: end function • The first one is that the root node in the attack graph. • The second one is that the node has parents, but the Starttime of its parent events are later than itself. The two cases both means the nodes have no former events. The function CheckNoVisited() is corresponding to the second case.
The function DFS() represents the depth-first traversal algorithm, and the attack chain set C obtained by each depthfirst traversal is added to the final attack chain set C.
IV. PRUNING BY NEGATIVE CAUSAL RULES
The idea of causal correlation is widely used in the field of alert correlation analysis [16] - [18] , [21] , [24] , [31] , [33] . Due to the lack of attack rules in SGMS and the difficulty of network vulnerability scanning, these methods are difficult to use directly. Negative causal correlation is designed in this paper. Using the negative causal correlation method to prune the attack chains not only ensures the causal correlation of the attack event, but also minimizes the dependence of expert knowledge, attack tagging and simulation works.
A. NEGATIVE CAUSAL RULES
In each multi-step attack, the adjacent attack steps are causally related. In order to satisfy the causal relationship in the attack chain, a method based on negative causal correlation is proposed.
Definition 3 (Negative Causal Relationship): If two alerts cannot meet the causal relationship, they meet negative causal relationship.
Definition 4 (Negative Causal Rules): The negative causal rules are represented as a matrix that defines the negative causal relationship between each two alert types. In the matrix, 1 means there is a negative causal relationship between the corresponding two alert types, and 0 means no negative causal relationship. For example, In the alert set {Alert 1 , Alert 2 , · · · , Alert n }, (Alert i , Alert j ) in the negative causal rules means the relationship between Alert i and Alert j . If (Alert i , Alert j ) is 1, they meet negative causal relationship. Table 3 shows two examples of attack chains extracted from the alert logs of a SGMS. The events in the attack chains 1 cannot constitute a causal relationship, that is, they meet negative causal relationship. The events in the attack chain 2 don't meet negative causal relationship. In attack chain 1, the first and the second events are ''DDoS event'' and ''Illegal access''. Usually, a complete DDoS attack may contain 4 preparations and final flood attacks. The denial of service attack is the last step, with the purpose to make the target machine unresponsive. Therefore, the DDoS attack and ''Illegal access'' cannot constitute a causal relationship. Unlike the attack chains 1, the events of the attack chain 2 ''Abnormal access data'' and ''Illegal access'' may constitute a causal relationship. The alert that ''Abnormal access data'' can be a virus script. After being infected by the script, the host IP becomes a stepping stones and continues to launch further illegal access to IP 6 .
B. PRUNING
In an attack chain, if the two adjacent events have negative causal relationship, such as DDoS event and illegal access in Table 3 , it is impossible to constitute an attack. To eliminate this connection, pruning by negative causal correlation is needed. As shown in Fig. 6 , when Alert 2 and Alert 3 meet the negative causal rules, the connection between them should be cut off. As a result, this attack chain is broken into two subchains C 1 and C 2 , and each part of them meet the negative causal rules. 
V. DENOISE BY NON-CASCADING EVENTS
After IP correlation and pruning by negative causal rules, the attack chains are built by meeting three conditions: IP relevance, causal relevance, and temporality. There are still some unreasonable chains. Table 4 gives out some alert log examples. After a series of processing, we obtained an attack chain consisting of alert 3 and alert 4. In this attack chain, the previous event is considered to be the cause of the latter one. But after backtracking the relevant alert records of IP 1 , it is found that IP 1 has been reporting the alert ''memory usage threshold exceeded'' for a period of time before receiving the abnormal data from IP 2 . Therefore, it can be inferred that the ''memory usage exceeds the threshold'' is not directly caused by ''sending abnormal data'' on a large probability. The above situation is called non-cascading event. Cascading event is defined as following:
Definition 5 (Cascading Event): When the events A, B satisfy the following two conditions, then B is said to be a cascading event of A. Let Q be a queue initially empty 3:
Alert ← (Type, SrcIP, DstIP, SrcPort, DstPort) 10: if FindAlert(t1, t2, Alert)isTrue then 11 : 12: return G 13: else 14: i ← i + 1 15 :
end for 20: end for 21: return G 22: end function
The algorithm for removing non-cascading events is Noise Reduction algorithm. For each attack chain, traverse its two adjacent events. Denote the former one as e i and the latter one as e j . The Starttime of e i is recorded as t 2 . From t 2 rollback to t 1 for a period of time t n . e i and e j are noncascading events if there is e j happened between t 1 and t 2 . The subchain between non-cascading events need to be broken. The breaking operation is in section IV.B.
After noise reduction, the final attack chain is formed.
VI. MODEL EVALUATION ON SGMS DATA
In this paper, 2 months alert logs of the SGMS of an area of China Grid are analyzed. We first developed a negative causal rules according to the characteristics of these data. Then, we analyzed the data of the two time windows and illustrated some of the suspicious attacks. In the global analysis, we describe the processing data of deduplication, aggregation, pruning and denoise, and the formation of the attack graph. Finally, the efficiency analysis is carried out. The balance between resource consumption and the number of attack chains generated can be achieved when t w = 3.
A. NEGATIVE CAUSAL RULES SETTING
We got 73 kinds of alerts from 7,915,376 alert logs. According to the characteristics of alert types, the 73 kinds of alerts were divided into 8 categories: database status abnormality, database storage abnormality, DoS, abnormal access data, memory exceptions, system exceptions, hardware exceptions and hardware plug in/out. Negative causal rules can be learned based on expert experience, as shown in Table 5 .
1) DATABASE STATE ABNORMALITY
It represents an abnormal state in the database. This abnormal state may be caused by an ongoing or completed attack. It may generate local exception or subsequently launch attacks after getting information from database.
2) DATABASE STORAGE ABNORMALITY
It indicates that the database storage space is insufficient. It is usually caused by operational non-compliance. It cannot be used as an intermediate step in a multi-step attack. Therefore, it cannot cause other attacks.
It should be noted that the above two classes of alerts are reported by user host rather than database server. It is important to fully understand how alerts are generated for making negative causal rules.
3) DoS
It indicates that the host may be subjected to a denial of service attack. The attack's goal is to cause unavailability to the target. Therefore, we believe the target host will not launch subsequent proliferation attacks.
4) ABNORMAL ACCESS DATA
It indicates that the destination host receives abnormal data. In fact, the abnormal data may be any kind of attack. Therefore, it may cause any kind of attack.
5) MEMORY EXCEPTIONS
It represents the memory abnormal state of the host. This abnormal state may be caused by an ongoing or completed attack. Therefore, it may subsequently launch attacks or generate local exception.
6) SYSTEM EXCEPTIONS
It represents the abnormal state of the system, which may be caused by users or attackers. Any subsequent attacks except hardware plug in/out may occur.
7) HARDWARE EXCEPTIONS
It represents hardware abnormal status, so any subsequent attacks except hardware plug in/out may occur.
8) HARDWARE PLUG IN/OUT
It represents there is a device plugging in or out, which may carry viruses. It may cause any attack. Fig. 7 shows an instance of pruning by negative causal rules. In this candidate attack chain, IP 1 first sent abnormal access data to IP 2 . Then some system exceptions occurred on IP 2 . Finally, a USB plugs in IP 2 . In this chain, there are two alert pairs need to be judged. The first is ''abnormal access data'' and ''system exceptions'', according to Table 5 , the corresponding number is 0. The second is ''system exceptions'' and ''USB plugged in''. The corresponding number is 0, according to the definition 4, the second alert pair match negative causal relationship and should be cut off.
B. SUSPICIOUS DATA ANALYSIS EXAMPLE
We take two time windows as examples. Window 1 is from May 3th, 2018 to May 5th, 2018. Window 2 is from June 10th, 2018 to June 12th, 2018. The time window t w is 3 days, and the non-cascading event time interval t n is set to 2 hours. Experiment 1: There are 101,101 alert logs in window 1. After reconstructing and deduplicating, we obtained 82,041 alert logs. Then node modeling and child node aggregation were performed. The data deduplication and aggregation effect is shown in Table 6 . After deduplication, the data was reduced to 81.15% of the original data. After aggregation, the branches was reduced to 5.47% of the original branches.
As shown in Table 7 , after the pruning by negative causal correlation and the noise reduction by non-cascading events, 739 attack chains were finally obtained, which accounted for 6.58% of the original data. Graphviz tool were used to draw the attack graphs.
Attack process can be inferred according to attack graphs. Followings are three instances.
1) Suspected to be the victim hosts sending back data Fig. 8 
2) Suspected to be the intruder controlling multiple hosts and then launch a DDoS attack
DDoS attacks are generated by flooding a system from several machines [25] . In some DDoS attacks, the intruders need to detect vulnerabilities and spread malicious applications to the hosts first for making them zombie hosts. In Fig. 9 After reconstruction and deduplication of the alerts, node modeling and child node aggregation were performed. Table 8 shows the result. After deduplication, the alerts was reduced to 66.68% of the original alerts. After aggregation, the branches were reduced to 1.17% of the original.
After the pruning by negative causal correlation and noise reduction by non-cascading events, as shown in Table 9 , 165 attack chains were finally obtained, accounting for 2.57% of the original. Followings are three instances of Experiment 2:
1) Suspected to be the intruder trying to raise local privileges Fig. 11 is centered on the host *.*.1.3, which is subjected to a large number of unauthorized accesses 
C. GLOBAL ANALYSIS
This section conducts experiments on the total of 7,915,376 alert logs from a certain area of the China grid from April 16th, 2018 to June 19th, 2018. The time window t w is 3 days, and the non-cascading event time interval t n is 2 hours, the time window slides forward every 1 day. As shown in Fig. 13 , data preprocessing can effectively remove redundancy. The average deduplication rate is 31.48%, the highest rate is 48.44% and the lowest rate is 13.75%. The denoise effect is better when the amount of data is larger. As shown in Fig. 14, the child node aggregation method can effectively reduce the number of branches of the alert graph. The number of branches is reduced by an average of 90.25%, up to 99.20%, and at least 97.85%. As shown in Fig. 15 , pruning and noise reduction can greatly reduce the unreasonable noise in the attack chains, and the number of attack chains is basically controlled to 10 2 magnitude. The number of the unreasonable chains is reduced by an average of 95.68%, up to 99.71% and at least 85.12%. Fig. 16 describes the number of attack graphs, the total number of nodes in all graphs, the maximum number of nodes in a single graph, and the average number of nodes per graph. The data of the attack graphs is relatively stable. The average number of attack graphs is 32.02, with a maximum of 54 and a minimum of 10, The average number of nodes per graph is 6.68. Except for the ''unauthorized access'' alert which broke out around May 15th, the size of the other attack graphs is reasonable, which is convenient for network administrator to analyze. When the attack broke out around May 15th, the attack graphs could become too large to analyze. In the face of this problem, the information of the attack chains can be used as an auxiliary analysis means to quickly locate the abnormal point.
D. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will compare the results and efficiency of the attack chain extraction under different time windows t w and get a suitble window size. The parameter t w is set to 1 day, 2 days, 3 days and 4 days, while the time range is 1 week, 2 weeks, and 3 weeks. We recorded the data of the attack chain initial construction, pruning by negative causal correlation, noise reduction by non-cascading events, the resource consumption, CPU usage, and memory usage. The resource consumption is evaluated in terms of program time consumption. Fig. 17(a) shows that in the initial construction of the attack chain, the program running time increases with t w and time range. At the same time, Fig. 17(b) shows that the number of attack chains also increases. Fig. 18(a) shows that in the pruning by negative causal correlation phase, the time consumption increases with t w and time range. At the same time, Fig. 18(b) that the number of attack chains generated also increases. Fig. 19(a) shows that in the noise reduction by noncascading event phase, the time consumption increases with t w and time range. At the same time, Fig. 19(b) shows that the number of attack chains generated also increases.
The time consumption of Fig. 17(a) -19(a) shows that as time window t w increase from 1 day to 4 days, the time consumption also increases. When t w increases from 3 days to 4 days, the total time consumption is increased by 5535.64 seconds. When t w is increased from 2 days to 3 days, the total time consumption only increases by 995.96 seconds. When t w increases from 1 day to 2 days, the total time consumption increases by 1375.91. second. Fig. 17 (b)-19(b) shows that as the time window t w increases from 1 day to 4 days, the number of attack chains increases. Fig. 18(b) shows the number of final attack chains. The number doesn't increase as the time consumption. When t w changes from 1 day to 2 days, the number of attack chains increases by 2297. When t w changes from 2 days to 3 days, it increases by 1851. When t w changed from 3 days to 4 days, it increases by 579. Fig. 20 and Fig. 21 show the CPU consumption percentage and memory consumption of the program running under different windows. With the increasing of t w , the CPU consumption is basically unchanged, and the memory usage increase accordingly. The maximum memory consumption is 3.05GB when t w = 4.
Considering the number of attack chains generated and the consumption of resources by different windows t w , a good balance is achieved when the value of t w is 3.
VII. MODEL EVALUATION ON DARPA 2000 DATA SET
To verify the validity of the model, we did another experiment with DARPA 2000, a complete DDoS attack dataset [26] . distributed denial-of-service attack scenario. The scenario includes four steps as followings:
1) Probing the network to find the hosts who had the Solaris sadmind vulnerabilities. 2) Finding valid hosts and using Daemon Buffer Overflow vulnerability in the Solaris operating system to install malicious programs into the three hosts. 3) Using Sadmind Exploit to get root privileges of the hosts. 4) Launching a DDoS attack against the final target. Data span is 69 minutes and 44 seconds, which is less than 3 days. So t w is not set. The non-cascading event time window t n is set to 10 minutes.
B. NEGATIVE CAUSAL RULES SETTING
Before prepocessing, we used snort as our IDS to transform network traffic to alerts. Since the attacker used the random IP address to attack the target host, MAC address detection for DoS attack was also added to the transformation.There are 32 kinds of alerts, 638 in total.
In order to formulate negative causal rules, we divided the alerts into 12 categories: WEB access response (succeed), WEB access response (failed), Login (succeed), Login (failed), WEB invalid access, SNMP invalid access, RPC sadmind invalid access, TELNET/RSH access, DoS, MS-Sql overflow attempt, Attack detection and Other abnormal package. Table 10 shows the corresponding negative causal rule and Table 11 shows the corresponding alerts for each categories.
C. RESULT ANALYSIS
As shown in Table 12 , after deduplication, the amount of data has been reduced to 55.64% of the original. After aggregation, the branches were reduced to 67.83%. After the pruning by negative causal correlation and noise reduction by noncascading events, as shown in Table 13 , 64 attack chains were finally obtained, accounting for 2.57% of the original number 2773. Fig. 22 shows the generated attack graph, in which the DDoS attack are detected. Attacker with 202.77.162.213 first probed several intranet hosts including 172. 16 In addition to this truly completed attack, other attacks can also be found in the attack graph. Host 172. 16 According to the above analysis, the first DDoS attack is the real attack among the three events. The successful extraction of the attack shows the validity of our model. The other two attacks may be fake or failed attacks. It can be seen that although the model of this paper is designed for SGMS, it can also effectively detect the attack events in the internet environment.
In this paper, the correlation time window t w is set to 3 days for the balance between resource consumption and attack chain generation. However, a smart attacker may attempt to evade detection by slowing down the attack steps. If the time difference between different attack steps is longer than the window we set, it can be a challenge to find them.
From the experiment of DARPA 2000, we can see some attacks detected are fake or uncompleted attacks. In order to reduce the false positives rate, we will try to improve the complexity of negative causal rules on the current basis. In addition, as an openly available data set, DARPA 2000 is classic but outdated. We only use it to verify our method. If the method is applied in current network, the corresponding negative causal rules should be constructed according to the network and alert characteristics.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The current security event analysis methods mainly include alert preprocessing and alert correlation.
A. ALERT PREPROCESSING
It mainly includes two parts: alert aggregation and false positives removal. The purpose of alert aggregation is to reduce the number of alerts. In the process of alert aggregation, either the source or destination IPs with the same alert content are aggregated to form super alerts [17] ; an alert event with the same source and destination IP is aggregated [24] ; alert events with the proper time order and in an attack life cycle are aggregated [28] . However, aggregation through the alert content or IP will loss some information, thereby hiding the path of the attack along the IP hops. Besides aggregation, common security analysis system will also remove the lowlevel or false-reported alerts judged by itself since to reduce the number of alerts [10] . This can apparently improve the accuracy of attack detection.
B. ALERT CORRELATION METHODS
Alert correlation method is a method based on attack intention analysis. In order to achieve their goal without being discovered, attackers usually carefully plan and take multiple actions. The actions are related to each other and effect each other. These methods using alerts' correlation to find attacks are called alert correlation analysis methods. Alert correlation analysis methods are used in Early Warning System (EWS) [29] , which can detect attackers' malicious intentions at an early stage. The methods are usually divided into following three ways [30] : similarity-based correlation analysis, attack sequence-based approach and attack samplebased machine learning.
1) Similarity-based association analysis method.
Yang et. al. [31] designed algorithm to calculate the similarity between alerts and classify the alerts with high similarity into one attack scenario. In addition to clustering with alert similarity, alert level, frequency, etc., Humphrey et. al. [15] also introduced supporting evidence, such as vulnerability data, logs and network resources to ensure clustering quality. Fredj [8] aggregated the alerts of the same intruder. Actually, in smart grid, it is possible to remove positive alerts or group alerts belonging to different attacks into one category. 2) Attack sequence-based approach usually needs an established attack pattern library, and then match the attack behaviors with the patterns. Ramaki et. al. [17] use the attack knowledge library to initialize the attack correlation rules. New attack forms are continuously discovered in the following data mining and correlation. Then keep enriching the correlation rules. Wang et. al. [32] traversed the vulnerability nodes to generate attack graph according to the collected system vulnerability information, network topology information and attack sequences. After optimizing the attack graph, the best attack route can be then calculated based on the attack cost and benefit. 3) Attack sample-based machine learning mainly uses the statististics to learn the attack mode in the sample. Bayesian Model [18] , [33] , Hidden Markov Model [20] and Deep Learning Model [34] are several common models. Machine learning-based methods have developed rapidly and been widely used for the advantages of high accuracy and the ability to discover the unknown attacks. Compared with rule methods, these methods usually have lower efficiency and higher false positive rate for getting better generalization. It is difficult to apply the above methods directly in SGMS, since the labeling of attacks and the establishment of attack pattern library are difficult. Therefore, the existing analysis methods need to be adjusted based on the data, environment and requirement of the SGMS. We propose a multistep attack detection model based on alerts of SGMS, which can automatically analyze the alert data and extract attack events.
In order to make it more intuitive for network administrators to understand the attack situation in the network, we usually visualize the attack events. A common kind of attack graphs take alerts as the nodes. In these graphs, each edge is assigned a weight that corresponds to the number of repetition of the transition from an alert to another [8] , [25] . Holgado et. al. [20] apply the Hidden Markov Model to analyze the attack events, and use the hidden state obtained to describe the various stages of the attack. Therefore, the nodes of the attack chains are the hidden states of the attack. These two kinds attack graphs can judge the progress of the attack through the alert or state change, but there is no concern about the specific IPs involved. Ramaki et. al. [17] also use alerts as the attack graph nodes. But the difference is the source and the destination IPs of the nodes are indicated in the graphs.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a multi-step attack detection model based on a small amount of priori knowledge is proposed for SGMS. The paper takes the two-month alert logs in an area of China Grid to verify the model and successfully extract attack chains. The model first obtains the alert graphs through IP correlation, and aggregates the child nodes of the alert graphs, reducing the average branch by 90.25%. Then pruning by negative causal correlation and non-cascading events denoise are used, which caused the average removal of 95.68% of the attack chains. After efficiency analysis, we found the model resource consumption and the number of attack chains are balanced when time window t w is 3 days. During tests, there are on average of 32.02 attack graphs per window and on average of 6.68 nodes per attack graph. Her current research interests include cryptography, information security, Internet security, and applied mathematics. She is also a Senior Member of the Chinese Association for Cryptologic Research. VOLUME 8, 2020 
